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Abstract
We study the consequences of leniency  reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who
spontaneously self-report to law enforcers  on sequential, bilateral, illegal transac-
tions, such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is known that
leniency helps deterring illegal relationships sustained by repeated interaction. Here
we Þnd that - when not properly designed - leniency may simultaneously provide
an effective governance mechanism for occasional sequential illegal transactions that
would not be feasible in its absence.
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1 Introduction
The economic and social costs of organized illegal transactions are enormous. Finan-
cial frauds, earning management schemes, Þrm/auditor and investment bank/analyst
collusion have recently undermined the smooth operation of Þnancial markets in more
than one country.1 The direct and indirect costs of drugs, arms, toxic waste, and peo-
ple trafficking are obvious and huge. Terrorism can also be seen as a form of organized
crime. And even economists traditional benevolence towards corruption, once seen as
a way to overcome excessive regulation, has been heavily questioned by recent studies
showing that corruption may reduce investment, Þnancial development, and growth.2
Since illegal transactions involve at least two parties and require trust among
them - their potential opportunism cannot be limited by court-enforced contracts -
one way law enforcement agencies traditionally Þght them is undermining trust by
shaping incentives to play one party against the other(s): ensuring that they Þnd
themselves in a situation as close as possible to a Prisoners Dilemma.3 Law enforcers
do this by awarding leniency  typically a reduction or cancellation of legal sanctions
accompanied by protection from retaliation and related beneÞts  to wrongdoers that
self-report helping to convict the rest of the gang. Formal or informal exchanges
of leniency against information are common in most world countries, and have been
extensively and successfully used to Þght MaÞa, drug dealing and terrorism.
It is by now well known that on multi-agent criminal relationships sustained by
repeated interaction leniency for self-reporting wrongdoers can have a particularly
strong deterrence effect: Spagnolo (2000a, 2004) showed that leniency for undetected
wrongdoers that spontaneously self-report could in principle costlessly deter all forms
of organized crime enforced by reputational considerations, making the investigation
activity redundant. To have such pervasive effects, however, leniency should not only
reduce sanctions, it should also reward wrongdoers that spontaneously report and turn
in their partners. Instead, in reality leniency is often moderate: it only reduces or
at most cancels legal sanctions against a self-reporting party (obvious examples are
the US and EU Leniency Programs for cartels). The main reason why such policies
often do not offer rewards to applicants appears ethical and political, as many people
consider immoral to reward someone who acted illegally, and fear the lack of trust
of an "informants society", although rewards to whistleblowers are and have been
1Leading the US government to introduce the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which, among other things,
reinforces protection of whistle-blowers.
2Bardhan (1997) offers an overview of the early literature; hundreds of economic papers have been
published since then. Mauros (1995) pioneering analysis estimates that a one standard deviation
improvement in a country corruption index is associated with an increase in the investment rate by
about 3 percent of GDP. Recent work on transition economies places corruption at the heart of their
poor post-privatization performance (see e.g. Boycko et al. 1995; Johnson et al. 2002; Black et al.
2000; and Jones et al. 2000).
3From a theoretical point of view, the Prisoners Dilemma game itself is perhaps the best known
model of leniency in law enforcement: the sanctions for a prisoner that unilaterally confesses his
crime are reduced to induce him to confess and prove guilty his former partner(s).
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successfully used in many situations.4
Moderate leniency may still produce signiÞcant beneÞts as it reduces law enforce-
ment cost for individual crimes (Kaplow and Shavell, 1994), and may have deterrence
effects on long term illegal relationships as it may facilitate prosecution (Motta and
Polo, 2003), and increase both the incentives to defect and report and the "strategic
risk" of entering an illegal arrangement (Spagnolo 2004). However, as it turns out,
moderate leniency may also have puzzling side effects on occasional illegal transac-
tions, which add a potential cost besides their just mentioned beneÞts.
Occasional sequential illegal transactions are extremely exposed to "governance"
or "hold up" problems, because to constrain opportunistic behavior from the party
delivering last, the party delivering Þrst cannot normally rely upon explicit contracts
enforced by an external system.5 We show that poorly designed leniency policies
may solve this governance problem by inducing transacting parties to collect hard
evidence on the illegal agreement and use it as a "hostage", threatening to report it
to law enforcers in case of "hold up". A poorly designed/managed leniency policy
may ensure that this threat is credible, so that all parties comply with the otherwise
unfeasible occasional illegal exchange.
Williamson (1983) Þrst discussed this third way by which parties may govern
economic transactions and hold-up problems: transferring hostages between par-
ties.6 An occasional sequential illegal exchange is a transaction in need of governance
because the party delivering Þrst risks being "held-up by the one delivering last. The
mechanism we uncover here is an example of this third form of governance, with the
hard evidence on the illegal transaction playing the role of the hostage: the informa-
tion is valueless in itself  as hostages typically are for the party that holds them 
but a party can credibly use it in response to hold-up to seek amnesty and punish the
partner that did not deliver.
We model asymmetric bilateral sequential illegal transactions, like a corrupt deal
between an entrepreneur or manager and a bureaucrat or auditor, where the ex-
istence/production of hard evidence on the illegal agreement, the sequence of the
exchange, and the distribution of illegal gains are all endogenously chosen by the par-
ties to ensure that the transaction can be implemented, given the legal framework.
We characterize the effects of leniency under all parameter conÞgurations, and Þnd
4See Spagnolo (2006) for a discussion of historical and present examples. Rewards to whistle-
blowers may entail potential costs not analyzed in the present setting, including reduced trust in
organizations and society, false reports aimed at capturing rewards, and courts increasing standards
of proof. Aubert et al. (2004) and Buccirossi et al. (2005) analyze several potential costs of reward-
ing whistleblowers, but argue that the beneÞts stemming from the deterrence effects of appropriately
designed rewards are likely to outweigh all these potential costs.
5We write normally because in some countries third parties like the MaÞa or less obviously
illegal networks partially solve these problems by taxing illegal transactions and offering enforcement
services, as discussed in Section 4.2.2 (see e.g. Gambetta, 1993; Gambetta and Reuter, 1995)
6The other two way of governing a transaction are of course explicit contracting and repeated
interaction ("relational exchange").
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that the moderate forms of leniency frequently implemented in reality may indeed
have a paradoxical side effect: they may provide an effective enforcement mechanism
for occasional, sequential illegal transactions that would not be enforceable in their
absence  nor in the absence of law enforcement altogether.
We mentioned that Kaplow and Shavell (1994) highlighted how the policy of offer-
ing a lenient treatment to wrongdoers that spontaneously self-report reduces the pool
of individuals to monitor without reducing deterrence, thereby directly reducing law
enforcement costs (see also Malik, 1993); and that when agents are risk averse, this
policy also increases welfare by reducing the overall risk agents bear. Innes (1999a,b)
stressed the value of the early remediation of damages from a crime that encour-
aging self-reporting entails.7 These analyses focus on the case of single wrongdoers
committing isolated crimes, in the tradition of Becker (1968).
In a novel strand of literature, Motta and Polo (2003), Spagnolo (2000, 2004),
Rey (2003), Aubert et al. (2004), Harrington (2005), and others analyse groups of
organized wrongdoers who must govern/sustain internal cooperation (e.g. collusion)
through self-enforcing illegal agreements, as illegal explicit contracts cannot be en-
forced by courts by deÞnition. They show that the problem becomes then fundamen-
tally different, dynamic, because repeated interaction or reputational concerns must
be relied upon to govern internal opportunism; and that leniency deters organized
crime - tightening "self-enforcing constraints" - by facilitating prosecution, increasing
incentives to cheat on partners and report, protecting those who cheat and report from
former partners revenge, and increasing the "riskiness" of the criminal agreements.8
The present paper extends the analysis to occasional, asymmetric, sequential op-
portunities for illegal cooperation that cannot be governed by long term considera-
tions, and highlights a potential perverse effect that awarding leniency to wrongdoers
that self-report may have on these. Analogous negative effects are discussed by Spag-
nolo (2000b) in the context of multiunit procurement auctions, and by Ellis and
Wesley (2002) in a differentiated dynamic oligopoly. Potential perverse effects of law
enforcement instruments have been highlighted before, among others, by Mookherji
and Png (1995), Livernois and McKenna (1999), and Boadway et al. (2002), but these
effects are very different from the one we point out here, and concern sanctions rather
than leniency.
Section 2 presents the simplest model we could think of to identify the alterations
of individual incentives induced by a moderate leniency program that may implement
sequential illegal transactions. Section 3 analyzes the model and presents the main
results. Section 4 discusses extensions, tests the robustness of our results, and relates
them to some existing literature, traditional arguments in favor of leniency, and reality.
Section 5 brießy concludes.
7See also Innes (2000) and (2001).
8Fees and Walzl (2004) also address leniency with criiminal teams, but use a static model that
fails to endogenize collusion. See Spagnolo (2006) for a survey of this burgeoning Þeld.
3
2 The model
For concreteness we phrase the model as a corrupt exchange between an entrepreneur
and a bureaucrat, but everything could be restated in terms of an exchange of "favors"
between an auditor and a manager, a deal between a drug producer and a drug retailer,
or any other sequential illegal transaction. Therefore, the main results will be stated
in more general terms.
The illegal transaction. There are two agents, a bureaucrat (B) and an en-
trepreneur (E). The entrepreneur has an investment opportunity with net present
value v > 0 that can be realized only if the bureaucrat performs an action a, illegal or
contrary to his duty. To perform this action the bureaucrat may require compensa-
tion, a bribe b with 0 ≤ b ≤ v.9 We assume that if the bureaucrat, by performing the
illegal action, does not increase his monetary gain, he prefers to behave legally. Cor-
ruption is an illegal agreement between the bureaucrat and the entrepreneur according
to which the former should do a and the latter should pay b.
Evidence. The application of a leniency program and law enforcement in general
require that some "hard evidence" on the illegal transaction exist. The existence of
hard evidence may either result from the exchange itself or be deliberately produced
by the parties (e.g. writing down and sign illegal agreements, taking pictures, or
keeping any other records of meetings and decisions). To simplify and sharpen our
result on the use of evidence as a hostage, we assume that absent an explicit decision
by the agents to produce hard evidence on the agreement, no hard evidence exist. We
also assume that once hard evidence is produced, both parties posses it and the
law enforcers have the possibility to Þnd it when auditing the agents and use it to
convict them. If an agent directly reports the hard evidence to the law enforcers,
then corruption is proved and agents are convicted/sanctioned with certainty. If the
parties choose not to produce hard evidence, then they cannot be convicted for the
illegal exchange.10
Law enforcement. At the end of the game, law enforcers audit agents with proba-
bility α. If hard information is produced and agents are audited corruption is detected
and parties are convicted. Therefore, the probability of conviction is α < 1. If hard
information is not produced the probability of conviction is 0.
The normal sanction for an agent i proved guilty of corruption, Si, consists in the
conÞscation of the illegal gain (v, b), if any, plus a Þne Fi, with i = B,E and Fi > 0.
9In the drug deal interpretation of the model, v would be the net value of the transacion and
b the agreed price.
10These assumptions imply that the decision to use strategically a leniency program to implement
an illegal transaction may entail a costly increase in the probability of conviction. This cost plays a
role in the extension discussed in Section 4.2.2. A positive but smaller probability of being convicted
when parties choose not to deliberately produce hard evidence, for example due to some hard evidence
beying automatically generated by the illegal agreement and potentially collected by law enforcers,
would make the model somewhat more cumbersome without changing any qualitative result.
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That is, Si = gi + Fi, where gB ∈ {0, b} and gE ∈ {0, v} , depending on the stage of
the exchange at which agents are discovered and sanctioned.
Leniency consists in reducing the sanction for a wrongdoer when this spontaneously
denounces the illegal transaction and provides evidence sufficient to convict the other
offender. We let RFi, i = B,E, denote the reduced monetary Þne for an agent i that
obtains leniency, with RFi ≤ Fi; and let RSi denote the overall reduced sanction, with
RSi = RFi + gi. Since we are taking Fi for given, a leniency program (or leniency
policy; LP from now on) is completely deÞned by the Þne reductions for the two
agents (RFE, RFB) . Of course, when RFi = Fi (RSi = Si) for all i we are in the case
of no leniency.
LPs may well establish positive transfers (negative additional Þnes) −RFi > 0.
Note, however, that even when the additional transfer is negative the overall reduced
sanction RSi = RFi + gi remains positive as long as −RFi < gi.
We now deÞne a Moderate Leniency Program (MLP).
DeÞnition 1 A LP is a MLP if the law enforcer never (i.e. at any possible Þnal node
of the game) pays a reward. Formally, LP is a MLP if RFB ≥ 0 and RFE ≥ 0.
Timing. Illegal transactions are carried out over time after the legislator has set
the parameters of public law enforcement, agents have observed them and reached an
agreement on bribe, sequence of exchange, and production of hard evidence.
The overall timing of the game is therefore as follows:
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
| | | |
Legislator sets Parties agree on a, b, Transaction Law enforcement
Fi and RFi and production of takes place agency audits
hard evidence with probability α
If parties decide not to produce information, occasional illegal transactions are not
enforceable and all parties obtain zero payoffs. Consider now the non-trivial subgame
in which the agents decide to produce hard evidence. We model the execution of the
corrupt transaction taking place at t = 2 as a sequential subgame that depends on
the sequence of the exchange decided by the parties. In this and in the next section
we discuss only one of the possible sequences in order to convey the main results of
the model in the simplest possible way. In Section 4.2 we extend the analysis to a
more general model.
Let us assume that the transaction subgame takes the form depicted in Figure 1.
At the Þrst node, E0, the entrepreneur has two available actions: either to pay the
bribe (b), or not to pay it (n). If she pays the bribe, the game moves to node B0.
At this node the bureaucrat has three available actions: denouncing the entrepreneur
(d); doing nothing (n); and performing the action (a). If the bureaucrat chooses n,
the game reaches node E1 where the entrepreneur can either denounce the bureaucrat
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(d) or not (n), and ends with the correspondent payoffs. If the bureaucrat performs
a, the game gets to node E2 where the entrepreneur has the same set of actions as in
E1 (d or n). The payoffs are reported at the Þnal nodes with the entrepreneurs payoff
Þrst and the bureaucrats payoff second.
Insert Figure 1 approximately here
Participation. Both agents must Þnd it in their interest to participate in the illegal
transaction. For the entrepreneur we must have:
(1− α)v − b− αFE ≥ 0. (PCE)
This condition deÞnes the maximum feasible value of the bribe b:
b ≤ b = (1− α)v − αFE.
For the bureaucrat, the participation constraint with production of hard evidence is:
(1− α)b− αFB ≥ 0, (PCB)
which identiÞes the minimum feasible value of the bribe b:
b ≥ b = α
1− αFB.
Since the participation constraints must hold even if the two agents could write a
binding contract, we assume that v > 0 is sufficiently large that  given the law
enforcement parameters (α, FB, FE)  there exist some b < v, with b ≤ b ≤ b, at
which the two participation constraints, (PCB) and (PCB), can be simultaneously
satisÞed. This implies (1− α)v ≥ αFE + α1−αFB.
Given the set
£
b, b
¤
, the maximum gain for the entrepreneur is:
ME = v − α
1− αFB.
Considering the probability of conviction and the monetary sanction FE, the en-
trepreneurs maximum expected gain, denoted by ME, is:
ME = (1− α) v − αFE − α
1− αFB.
Moreover, once the entrepreneur has paid the bribe (a sunk cost) her maximum ex-
pected gain becomes:
MEb = (1− α) v − αFE.
Analogously, for the bureaucrat the maximum expected gain is:
MB = (1− α)2 v − (1− α)αFE − αFB.
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Transaction implementation. The game is solved by backward induction, and the
equilibrium concept used is that of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE).
Given the legal framework and the parameters of the LP (if any), agents can choose
whether or not to produce hard evidence and the size of the bribe b to facilitate the
implementation of the occasional illegal transaction. Therefore, in the analysis of
the basic model we will say that, given a leniency program, occasional corruption is
implementable if there is one level of the bribe b such that the game has a SPNE in
which the bureaucrat performs the illegal action a, the entrepreneur pays the bribe b,
and neither agent denounces the other.
DeÞnition 2 An illegal transaction is implementable if the action proÞle (a, b) is
supportable in a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
Conversely, we will say that corruption is not implementable when no such equi-
librium exists.
3 Analysis
We characterize here the effects of leniency on one-shot corrupt transactions. As
anticipated in the introduction, we will show here that badly designed MLPs may end
up implementing otherwise unfeasible occasional illegal transaction by providing the
Þrst party that delivers with a credible threat  denouncing the corrupt deal to law
enforcers  that forces the other party to comply. To be able to implement the illegal
transaction with the threat of reporting, agents will produce hard evidence and use it
as a "hostage", thereby incurring the risk of being detected by the law enforcement
agency.
Consider Þrst the benchmark case where there is no leniency, so that Si = RSi
(RFi = Fi) for all i. Then it is easy to verify that, whatever the value of b, the en-
trepreneur cannot credibly threaten to report the illegal agreement to the law enforcer
if the bureaucrat does not deliver. If the entrepreneur retaliates against a defection
from agreed strategies by reporting (choosing d at node E1), she will face the full
sanction incurring an additional loss. Then, the bureaucrats best action is n, i.e.
keeping the gain from the partially executed illegal transaction without performing
the action required by the illegal agreement. Knowing this, the entrepreneur will not
enter into the illegal agreement in the Þrst place. Note that this reasoning applies
even when Fi = 0. This proves the Þrst, rather unsurprising result.
Proposition 1 Absent leniency programs, occasional sequential illegal transactions
are not implementable.
To render an occasional illegal exchange implementable for some b, agents can use
the hard evidence produced as a hostage, threatening to retaliate by reporting the
hard information to law enforcers in case the second mover does not comply with the
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terms of the illegal agreement. For this mechanism to work, several conditions must
be satisÞed besides participation constraints.
The Þrst condition regards the bureaucrat and it is a no-reporting condition.
Respecting the agreement at the second node (choosing a at B0) must be weakly
preferred to reporting (choosing d) and cashing the possible reward. This condition
is:
−RFB ≤ (1− α)b− αFB. (NR)
The other two conditions regard the entrepreneur. The Þrst can be called the
credible threat condition. The reduced Þne for the entrepreneur must be such
that he can credibly threaten to report to the law enforcer (to choose d at E1) if the
bureaucrat does not respect the agreement (choosing n at B0). This condition is:
RFE ≤ αFE. (CT)
The second condition concerning the entrepreneur, also a no-reporting constraint,
can be labelled the credible promise condition. The reduced Þne for the en-
trepreneur must be such that he can credibly promise he will not report (he will not
choose d at E2) if the bureaucrat obeys to the agreement at B0. This condition is:
−RFE ≤ (1− α)v − αFE. (CP)
All these conditions are summarized as follows:½ −RFB ≤ (1− α)b− αFB, and
−αFE ≤ −RFE ≤ (1− α)v − αFE. (C)
Consider now the effects of agents ability to optimally set the bribe to facilitate
the implementation of the illegal transaction. If necessary, agents can push the bribe
up to b = b in order to make the illegal exchange implementable. The necessary and
sufficient conditions that must be satisÞed for a corrupt exchange being implementable
are deÞned in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 An occasional illegal transaction is implementable for some b if and
only if the following conditions are simultaneously satisÞed:
−RFB ≤MB;
−αFE ≤ −RFE ≤MEb.
The intuition for this result is very simple. If the conditions deÞned in the propo-
sition hold, there is always a value of b such that all relevant promises and threats are
credible. In particular, the bureaucrat does not need to threaten the entrepreneur as
he gets the bribe in any case. Therefore, the only relevant condition for the bureaucrat
is that the LP is not so generous to lure him to cooperate with law enforcers even
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if the deal goes through. This obtains if the reduced sanction (possibly, the reward)
(−RFB) is below the maximum expected gain he can derive from the illegal exchange
(MB). The two conditions regarding the entrepreneur guarantee that she can credibly
threaten to report, if the bureaucrat does not perform (RFE < αFE), and credibly
promise not to report if the bureaucrat does. For the entrepreneur the distribution
variable, b, is irrelevant because once the bribe has been paid, she cannot recoup it in
any case, so that the latter condition holds if −RFE ≤MEb.
If we consider only MLPs we can state the following corollary of proposition 2.
Corollary 1 Any MLP such that RFE ≤ αFE implements occasional sequential ille-
gal transactions.
Proof. The deÞnition of MLP guarantees that −RFB ≤ MB and that −RFE ≤
MEb. Hence proposition 2 applies if RFE ≤ αFE.
This corollary shows that a moderate leniency program creates the opportunity to
undertake illegal transactions that would otherwise not be implementable when the
reduced Þne for the entrepreneur is lower than the expected Þne.
All LPs that do not satisfy the conditions stated in Proposition 2 do not enforce
occasional illegal transactions, if the game follows the sequence of moves described
in the model. In particular, LPs that are sufficiently generous to reward a party
above his/her maximum expected gain do not have this couterproductive side effect,
and may have strong deterrence effects for illegal transactions sustained by repeated
interaction, as explained in the next section.
4 Generalization and extensions
In this section we discuss several extensions of the basic model to verify the robustness
of our conclusions to changes in modelling assumptions.
4.1 Alternative sequences and general results
In the previous sections we considered one possible sequence of the illegal exchange,
the case where the entrepreneur pays the bribe before the bureaucrats delivers the
favor. Of course, in general parties can adopt several alternative timings to implement
the illegal transaction. A general version of the game is depicted in Figure 2. At the
Þrst node the entrepreneur pays a portion q of the bribe, then the bureaucrat decides
whether to denounce the illegal agreement, perform a, or simply keep the portion of
the bribe already cashed. In the latter two cases, the entrepreneur moves again and
can pay the remaining portion of the bribe, (1−q), if the bureaucrat has respected the
agreement. In all cases the entrepreneur can report the illegal transaction to the law
enforcer or do nothing. The bureaucrat has the same actions available at his following
nodes.
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Insert Figure 2 approximately here
where:
A =
½
0
−qb− FE
if q = 0
if q > 0
,
B =
½
0
−RFB
if q = 0
if q > 0
,
C =
½
0
−qb−RFE
if q = 0
if q > 0
,
D =
½
0
−FB
if q = 0
if q > 0
,
E =
½
0
−qb− αFE
if q = 0
if q > 0
,
F =
½
0
(1− α) qb− αFB
if q = 0
if q > 0
.
The timing analyzed in section 3 assumes that q = 1. In this section we Þrst
discuss the case in which q = 0 and then show that parties cannot implement an
illegal exchange by choosing an intermediate value of q if the same transaction is not
implementable either with q = 0 or with q = 1. Therefore, the union of the sets of
LPs that implement the illegal transaction in one of the two extreme timings identify
the entire set of LPs with counterproductive side effects.
Consider the alternative sequence in which q = 0, as depicted in Figure 3. As
for MLPs, by the same reasoning as in Section 3 is immediate that the necessary
and sufficient conditions for the illegal transaction being implementable under this
reversed sequence is RFB < αFB. Given than agents can choose the sequence that
allows them to implement their transaction, we can already say that for a MLP to
implement the occasional illegal transaction it is sufficient that either RFE < αFE,
or RFB < αFB.
Insert Figure 3 approximately here
More in general, the conditions under which a LP implements occasional illegal
transactions under the reverse timing are the following.
Proposition 3 An occasional illegal transaction that follows the sequence deÞned by
q = 0 is implementable for some b if and only if the following conditions are simulta-
neously satisÞed:
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−RFE ≤ME; and
−αFB ≤ −RFB ≤MB.
Proof. Imposing the no-reporting condition for the entrepreneur and the credible
promise condition for the bureaucrat, we get½ −RFE ≤ (1− α)v − b− αFE, and
−RFB ≤ (1− α)b− αFB; (C*)
These conditions deÞne the following bounds on b½
b ≤ (1− α)v +RFE − αFE, and
b ≥ −RFB
1−α − α1−αFB;
Considering the parties ability to set b we need to identify those LPs such that there
exist a value of b ∈ [b, b] that lies beteween the bounds deÞned by C*. Hence, b must
be not greater than the upper bound and b not lower than the lower bound. This leads
to −RFE ≤ME and −RFB ≤MB. The credible threat condition for the bureaucrat
imposes RFB ≤ αFB that identiÞes the third condition stated in the Proposition.
This condition, together with −RFE ≤ME guarantees that the upper bound implied
by C* is not lower than the lower bound.
The (inÞnite) more complex alternative sequences of the transaction subgame in
which the entrepreneur pays only a fraction q ∈ (0, 1) of the bribe at the beginning
of the sequence of moves does not change the conditions in which a LP has counter-
productive effects, as proved in the following complete characterization.
Proposition 4 The parties cannot implement an illegal transaction by choosing a
q ∈ (0, 1) if the transaction is not implementable either with q = 1, or with q = 0.
Therefore, a LP implements occasional illegal transactions if and only if either the
conditions in Proposition 2 or the conditions in Proposition 3 are satisÞed.
Proof. Consider the game descibed in Figure 2 and let the strategy of each player
i = E,B, be denoted by a triple where the Þrst element identiÞes the action chosen
at node i0, the second the action at node i1 and the third the action at node i2. The
illegal transaction is implemented also if the entrepreneur pays only the Þrst fraction
of the bribe, provided that the bureaucrat chooses a at B0 and n at the other nodes.
Therefore two possible strategy proÞles implement the illegal trasaction if they form a
SPNE. The Þrst one is (qb, d, n) for the entrepreneur and (a, n, n) for the bureaucrat.
The second is (qb, d, (1− q) b) for the entrepreneur and (a, d, n) for the bureaucrat.
The Þrst proÞle is a SPNE if and only if
−RFB ≤ (1− α) qb− αFB and
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−αFE ≤ −RFE ≤ (1− α) v − αFE.
Note that if there is a LP that satisÞes these conditions for a given q the same LP
satisÞes these conditions for any q0 ≥ q. Hence the set of LPs that allow the parties
to implement the illegal exchange is the largest when q = 1. The second proÞle is a
SPNE if and only if
(1− α) qb− αFB ≤ −RFB ≤ (1− α) b− αFB and
−αFE ≤ −RFE ≤ (1− α) v − αFE − (1− q) b.
In this case if there is a LP that satisÞes these conditions for a given q the same
LP satisÞes these conditions for any q0 ≤ q. Hence the set of LPs that allow the
parties to implement the illegal exchange is the largest when q = 0. This proves that,
given a LP, the two parties cannot implement illegal transactions that would not be
implementable either with q = 1 or with q = 0, by choosing an intermediate value of
q.
The results of our model can therefore be summarized in simple economic terms
as follows:
A LP does not implement occasional illegal transactions either if (a) it does not
reduce the Þne for either party below his/her expected full Þne; or if (b) it grants a
reward to at least one of the two agents above his/her maximum expected gain from
the illegal transaction.
Condition a) implies that neither the entrepreneur nor the bureaucrat can credibly
threaten to report the illegal transaction if the other party does not comply with
the agreement. Condition b) guarantees that neither of the two agents can credibly
promise not to inform the law enforcer at some point in time during the transaction.
All other LPs implement occasional illegal transactions.
Meeting condition a) to avoid this side effect implies reducing the attractiveness of
leniency for agents involved in long-term criminal relationships, which can be costly
in terms of reduced deterrence. As pointed out by Spagnolo (2000, 2004), Buccirossi
and Spagnolo (2001), and Aubert et al. (2004), well designed and managed LPs that
generously reward self-reporting agents, as required by condition b), not only may
eliminate the counterproductive side effects characterized in this paper; they may also
substantially increase deterrence of dynamic criminal relationships sustained by re-
peated interaction. As mentioned in the introduction, bounty schemes that reward
informants are not very common nowadays, most likely because they are not terribly
appealing from an "ethical" and "social" perspective: "trust" and "cooperation" have
a strongly positive connotation in most modern cultures, with little distinction on the
objectives of such cooperation, while "snitches" and "informants" have very negative
ones, even when they greatly increase social welfare. Of course rewards are not Nir-
vana, as mentioned in the introducion they could potentially generate other costs we
abstract from in our model, particularly if they are poorly designed or inappropriately
managed. However, they have been extensively and successfully used in the past, and
are still in place in some advanced jurisdictions with respect to important crimes. The
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recent, successful US examples of the False Claim Act, providing substantial rewards
to whistleblowers who Þle lawsuits against companies or individuals that defraud the
government, and of the antitrust "Amnesty Plus" program, awarding a large reduction
in a monetary Þne due for a Þrst convicted cartel (hence a large positive monetary
reward) to cartel members that report information on an other not yet uncovered
cartel, show how carefully designed and appropriately managed rewards schemes for
whistleblowers can substantially improve the efficiency of law enforcement, with little
or no side effects.
4.2 Alternative mechanisms to implement an illegal exchange
In the model discussed so far, absent a LP no occasional illegal transaction takes
place. This of course does not imply that we are considering a world where, without
LPs, there is no crime. Our obvious implicit assumption is that in any society there
exist illegal transactions that do take place, for example because they are part of
long term illegal relationships and can therefore be sustained/governed by repeated
interaction or reputational concerns, and at the same time many potential occasional
illegal transactions that cannot realize absent a LP. Our point is that, when LPs are
introduced to deter the former forms of crime, if designed in certain ways they may
at the same time help the latter forms of crime realize, with ambiguous total welfare
effects. Fortunately there is no real trade-off: as mentioned at the end of the previous
section, there are ways to both avoid the side effect and increase deterrence of long
term illegal relationships.
It is interesting at this point to further extend the model and verify whether a LP
can have counterproductive effects even on sequential illegal transactions that could in
principle be implemented also without it. The implementation of a sequential illegal
exchange requires an alternative governance mechanism to the LP that provides a
credible threat to the agent that delivers Þrst and that is subject to the opportunistic
behavior of the coconspirator(s). For an illegal transaction a mechanism can be: a) the
(inÞnite) repetition of this or analogous transactions; b) the provision of costly illegal
"enforcement services" by a third party with commitment power; c) the direct threat
of violence from one transacting party made credible by behavioral or reputational
forces.
4.2.1 Repetition
As already mentioned, if the illegal exchange is not occasional but repeated with posi-
tive probability each period, agents can threaten to terminate their illegal cooperation
in case one party behaves opportunistically. Folk theorems prove that if agents value
future gains at a discount factor above a critical value the threat of the termination of
the relationship suffices to implement the illegal transaction. An immediate corollary
of our previous results is that, if the game we sketched does not change when repeated
in time (e.g. with the accumulation of wealth by parties, or the increase in sanctions
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with the duration of crime), LPs that implement occasional illegal transactions also
facilitate repeated illegal transactions making them implementable at any discount
factor. This follows immediately from the repeated play of a Nash equilibrium in a
stage game being always a SPNE of the inÞnitely repeated game originating from
the repetition of that same stage game. This result already shows that a poorly de-
signed LP may facilitate the implementation of illegal exchanges that could have been
implemented through an alternative mechanism.11
More interestingly, Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2001, Theorem 1) show that even
LPs that do not implement occasional (one-shot) illegal transactions may end up
facilitating the enforcement of repeated ones. The intuition for this result is the
following. In a repeated game, each agent confronts the short-term gains he could
get by cheating on his partner (e.g. cashing the bribe without returning the favor),
after which the illegal relationship breaks down, with the long-term gains he expects
from continuing to respect the agreement and going on with the illegal relationship.
A poorly designed LP may have the effect of stabilizing the relationship by reducing
agents short-term gains from deviation. This may happen because, if the Þrst movers
threat to report in case his partners defects becomes credible (thanks to the LP), the
second movers optimal defection is not just running away with the money. If he
does so, he triggers the opponents threat, which in turn induces the law enforcer to
intervene and impose a sanction on the deviator. His best deviation becomes instead
abandoning the illegal relationship and self-reporting. If the LP is not sufficiently
generous, i.e. if it does not reward sufficiently the informer, the short run gain from
deviation becomes lower with the LP, whereas the punishment against an agent that
defects and self-reports is the same as in the absence of a LP, since after one party
defects and reports the relationship simply breaks down. Because short-run gains
from defection decrease but losses from punishments do not, the LP loosens the second
movers incentive constraint and makes the illegal relationship sustainable at lower
discount factors.12
On the other hand, in the same working paper it is also shown that a more generous
LP, besides not helping to implement occasional transactions, has a much stronger
deterrence effect on illegal exchanges sustained by the prospect of future interaction,
conÞrming results in Spagnolo (2000-2004).
4.2.2 Criminal enforcement services
Some occasional illegal transactions are implemented thanks to the provision of illegal
"enforcement services" by a criminal organization. Gambetta an Reuter (1995) argue
that the stability of Sicilian cartels used to be guaranteed by the MaÞa, a long-
living organization sensitive to its reputation and therefore able and willing to commit
11Often, however, expected sanctions and damage claims change during a long term criminal
relation, and in these cases this argument in this simple form does not apply.
12Again, for a complete characterization of LPs with counterproductive effects in repeated games
we refer to our working paper, Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2001).
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to punish deviants harshly ex post. These services entail a cost for parties that
(more or less willingly) "purchase" them, that also includes the expected sanction
for collaborating with such a criminal organization. If we denote this cost with c,
we have that absent a LP only those occasional illegal transactions with net present
value v ≥ c are feasible. The introduction of a poorly designed LP may increase the
number of feasible illegal transactions if the expected cost of using it strategically
to implement the transaction is lower than c. This cost stems from the increased
probability of being convicted given by the need to produce hard evidence, and is
equal to α (SE + SB). Agents then will use the LP to implement only transactions
such that v ≥ αFB + 11−αFE. Hence, if αFB + 11−αFE < c the LP facilitates illegal
transactions even when a third-party enforcement service is present, otherwise, it does
not.
4.2.3 Direct violence
If at least one of the two agents has an observable "preference for violent revenge", such
that the utility he derives from punishing violently a former partner that "cheated"
is larger than the cost of doing so, then an occasional sequential illegal transaction
can easily be enforced by having this agent delivering Þrst. Such a preference could
either be a "real" (internalized) preference for reciprocity, or it can be due to a classic
reputational concern of an agent planning to undertake other illegal transactions in
the future.
This case is described by the game depicted in Þgure 4 where the entrepreneur has
the possibility to retaliate against the bureaucrat at node E1 with a violent action, dv
(not available in the previous version of the game), that gives her net utility U and
impose a loss L on the bureaucrat, with U,L > 0. Note that some assumptions are
implicit in this description of the game. The Þrst one is that some hard evidence is
produced when parties agree to conclude the exchange. If producing hard evidence
must be a joint decision, when parties have an alternative mechanism to implement
their crime, they will choose not to produce the hard evidence, making the LP in-
effective. The second assumption is that the game ends if the bureaucrat chooses
action d at node B0, so that the entrepreneur cannot punish him if he deviates by
reporting. This situation occurs if the bureaucrat is put under effective protection or
if the Þrst-moving revenge-loving agent is immediately sent to jail, so that the violent
revenge is effectively prevented.
Obviously in this setting a LP cannot add anything to agents ability to implement
the occasional illegal transaction, as we are assuming that they have a costless way to
implement it. Therefore, the only interesting question is whether a LP that could deter
transactions implementable by this kind of violent threats may end up implementing
other illegal transactions that would not be feasible otherwise. The answer to this
question is no. The reason is that also in this case, in order to have deterrence
effects, the LP must be sufficiently generous. This is because the decision of the
bureaucrat to denounce the other agent is rational if and only if the LP leaves the
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bureaucrat better off relative to his maximum expected gain from not cheating in
the transaction (−RFB > MB). In the reversed sequence, in which the bureaucrat
moves Þrst (assuming that he is the agent with a preference for violent revenge), the
equivalent condition is −RFE > ME. If both agents can credibly use violence at no
cost and, therefore, can freely choose the timing of their moves, then the LP is effective
if and only if both −RFB > MB and −RFE > ME. All these LPs do not implement
an occasional illegal transaction. Note also that this reasoning proves that MLPs do
not help in Þghting occasional illegal trasactions where agents have a costless way to
implement it and may facilitate the implementation of other illegal deals.
Insert Figure 4 approximately here
We can conclude that a LP that implements an otherwise unfeasible occasional
illegal transaction between wrongdoers without a preference for revenge would not
be sufficiently generous to deter an illegal transaction sustained by a credible violent
threat. Conversely, an LP sufficiently generous to deter an occasional sequential deal
sustained by the threat of violence would not implement an occasional sequential deal
between wrongdoers who cannot credibly threaten violent revenge. In other words,
in this scenario where there exists a costless way to implement the illegal transaction
a LP cannot make things worse. However, only correctly designed LPs that do not
have counterproductive effects in other circumstances can be beneÞcial.
5 Conclusions
Within a stylized model we characterized the effects on the viability of occasional,
sequential illegal transactions of all conceivable parametrizations of leniency policies
for wrongdoers that spontaneously self-report to the law enforcing agency, turning in
their partners.
The results highlight a risk involved in using moderate forms of leniency in law
enforcement, forms that only cancel or reduce self-reporting parties sanctions below
the expected Þne they would be subject to without reporting. Economists are aware
that poorly designed incentive schemes may have counterproductive side effects, and
leniency programs - as the law enforcement system in general - are incentive schemes.
The moderate form of leniency often implemented around the world, while plausibly
deterring some long-term criminal arrangements sustained by repeated interaction,
may have a counterproductive side effect: it could be exploited by sophisticated
wrongdoers to implement occasional illegal transactions that would not be feasible
otherwise.
More generous forms of leniency that offer a reward to at least one party if he or she
self-reports, if appropriately designed and managed, are not subject to this potential
drawback and may further increase deterrence of long-term criminal relationships.
Enriching the model by introducing asymmetric information, uncertainty, mis-
takes in law enforcement, and other important features of reality we kept out of our
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model will surely modify the boundaries of our characterization, and it will be very
interesting to understand in which direction. However, we are fairly conÞdent that
our qualitative conclusions will not change with future work. Leniency for wrongdoers
that spontaneously self-report is a very powerful but also a potentially dangerous tool,
that must therefore be properly designed and managed with care.
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Figure 1: The illegal exchange
Figure 2: General version of the sequence of the illegal exchange
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Figure 3: The illegal exchange with q = 0
Figure 4: Illegal transaction with direct credible violence
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